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This paper investigates the information content of futures option prices when the futures price 
is regulated while the futures option price itself is not. The New York Board Of Trade 
provides the empirical setting for this type of dichotomy in regulation. Most commodity 
derivatives markets regulate prices of all derivatives on a particular commodity 
simultaneously. NYBOT has taken an almost  unique position by imposing daily price limits 
on their futures contracts while leaving the options prices on these futures contracts 
unconstrained.  The study takes a particular interest in the volatility and futures prices of the 
options-implied risk neutral density when the underlying futures contract is locked limit.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Two of the three major economic functions of a derivatives market are price discovery and 
price dissemination. In contrast to financial derivatives markets, in agricultural derivatives 
markets the underlying cash commodity markets tend to be heterogeneous, hampering a 
unique price discovery and dissemination. At any one time in an agricultural derivatives 
market there may be a multitude of prices depending on, amongst other things, producer, 
quality and location. A typical example is the spot price of cocoa, as reported by the New 
York Board of Trade on the 20
th of June, 2001. On that day, the U.S. Cocoa Merchants’ 
reported spot price varied from a high of $1,166 per metric ton (for main crop Ghana, Grade 
1) to a low of $976 per metric ton (for Superior Season Arriba), both prices ex-dock, eastern 
seaboard. These prices are reported on a daily basis and often involve some kind of averaging. 
It is not clear whether they are customer, or even transaction, specific and may, therefore, not 
be relevant to the ‘representative’ customer. 
 
Standardization of the traded commodity, and the concentration of trade provided by the 
derivatives markets, lead to a convergence of market opinion regarding the ‘representative’ 
commodity’s equilibrium price. This standardized commodity then serves as a benchmark for 
market participants against which the cash product (often of inferior quality compared to the 
derivative standard and available at some distant location) can be accurately priced. Given 
this fundamental role, it seems surprising to observe that many commodity derivatives 
markets – unlike their financial counterparts – use price limits which effectively censor the 
range of price discovery.  
 
Hall and Kofman (2001) survey the major derivatives exchanges worldwide and find that 
two thirds use price limit regulation, and these are principally employed for agricultural 
derivatives. Price limits, according to Telser (1981), Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) and many 
others, obstruct by postponing price discovery. Other authors such as Ma, Rao and Sears 
(1989), argue that price limits may enhance price discovery by avoiding over-reaction to 
fundamental price signals. Brennan (1986), who agrees that price limits obstruct price 
discovery, suggests that price limits may, nevertheless, play an important role in cost 
minimizing contract design. In fact, he argues that price limits can be a natural outcome of a 
standardized futures contract. Through the introduction of temporary uncertainty regarding 
their true losses, traders will be more inclined to meet their margin call when marking-to- 3
market. Of course, this beneficial function of price limits disappears as soon as traders receive 
a signal regarding the true, but unobserved loss. The stronger the signal, the less effective 
price limits in hiding the true loss.  
 
Such signals could come from the cash market (though as argued above, these markets 
tend to be opaque for many commodities), from nearest-delivery futures contracts for which 
the limits are lifted, or from related derivatives markets that operate without limits. To prevent 
these signals originating from related assets, most derivatives exchanges (e.g., the CBOT) 
simultaneously restrict the futures and futures options to trade within price limits. Brennan’s 
argument is only valid for contracts where contract default by traders not meeting margin 
calls, lead to substantial open positions for the clearing house. For futures, this implies that 
the cost of trade interruption caused by price limits is offset by the reduction in contract 
default. For futures options, this risk of contract default is nonexistent, since the losing party 
will just let the option expire and, having already paid a premium to eliminate exposure. 
 
Price limits, then, impose a real cost on option trading. This would suggest that the futures 
options traders subsidize the futures traders. Due to the non-linear relationship between 
futures options prices and underlying futures prices, it is not a trivial matter to set matching 
price limits in the futures options market at different exercise prices. As most exchanges use a 
fixed price range for all series, they do not attempt to tailor these price limits correctly. An 
easy option to resolve this dilemma is to suspend trading in futures options whenever the 
futures price limits are invoked. 
 
If the futures option prices are not limited, it is possible to use traded futures options prices 
to derive the implied futures price as a signal for the limit locked futures price. Due to its 
sheer volume, contract standardization, and liquidity, the futures market usually serves as the 
predominant source of price discovery for market participants in the related cash and options 
markets. It seems only logical that the futures options market will claim this role whenever 
the futures market price discovery function is obstructed by price limits. In practical terms, 
this implies a directly observable migration of volume from the constrained to the 
unconstrained derivatives market. At the same time, the options implied futures price should 
provide a market signal for the unobservable, constrained, futures price. 
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With two exceptions, migration of price discovery due to price limits, has so far attracted 
little attention in the literature. The first exception is a paper by Evans and Mahoney (1996), 
which estimates the implied cotton futures price from cotton futures options using the put-
call-parity relation whenever the futures price is locked limit. This type of indirect inference, 
based on observed market prices, has become popular as model based volatility structures are 
nowadays routinely compared to options implied volatilities. More recently, researchers have 
also derived implied higher order moments, like implied skewness and implied kurtosis (e.g., 
Martin, Forbes and Martin, 2001), and there now is a large literature that infers the full 
probability density function from traded options prices. The second paper that considers 
migration of price discovery, Melick and Thomas (1997), uses this approach to infer the 
implied probability density function for crude oil futures prices from crude oil futures option 
prices. 
 
This study extends these papers in a number of ways. Firstly, unlike Evans and Mahoney 
(1996), it takes account of the fact that the futures options are in fact American-style. The 
early exercise premium turns out to be non-trivial and, unfortunately, requires abandonment 
of the simple put-call-parity as a tool to ‘back out’ the implied futures price. Melick and 
Thomas (1997) develop a method that combines a mixture of lognormal distributions with no-
arbitrage bounds for American options, to infer the implied martingale equivalent density of 
futures prices. As this study is unable to replicate that approach due to data limitations, it 
utilises the single lognormal Barone-Adesi Whaley approximation for American options. 
 
Secondly, unlike Evans and Mahoney (1996), but similar to Melick and Thomas (1997), 
the study extracts the implied futures density, not just the implied futures price. Thus it can 
compare implied against observed (limit-locked) futures prices, as well as the implied 
volatility behaviour surrounding price limit moves. Melick and Thomas allow more flexible 
densities than this study, but, once again, it was believed that most empirical applications do 
not allow for this level of sophistication. 
 
Thirdly, the study’s analysis applies to intraday futures and futures options data, instead of 
using end-of-day settlement prices, as in the Evans and Mahoney (1996) and Melick and 
Thomas (1997) papers. The paper claims more accurate identification of the price limit 
distortion, which is essentially an intraday phenomenon. By including intraday limit episodes,  5
this allows for an expansion of the sample size while avoiding non-synchronicities in the 
futures options and futures data. 
 
Fourthly, the study carefully constructs control samples in order to avoid spurious 
conclusions, based on either model misspecification or non-synchronous option prices. The 
control samples were taken when the futures price was still within the limits on the same day 
as the limit move occurrence. Obviously, for this sampling scheme, intraday transactions data 
are required. 
 
Finally, both other studies are based on short sample periods: nine months in Melick and 
Thomas (1997), and one month in Evans and Mahoney (1996). Whereas Melick and Thomas 
choose their sample to focus on an unusual episode (i.e., the Persian Gulf Crisis in 1990/91), 
Evans and Mahoney’s sample seems to be unnecessarily restrictive. This study’s sample 
spans seven years of data, including two years after the futures price limits were officially 
lifted on the commodity futures considered. This creates an additional control sample in 
which so-called phantom (or pseudo) limits are investigated. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 of the paper briefly 
elaborates on the method chosen to extract the implied futures prices density function from 
traded futures option prices. It also discusses the merits of a number of alternative methods 
that have appeared in the literature. Section 3 provides an empirical application to commodity 
futures and futures options traded at the New York Board of Trade. Sample selection issues 
are discussed in some detail. Section 4 concludes. 
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2  Estimating implied futures prices from futures option prices 
 
This study considers futures and matching futures options contracts where the futures 
contracts are regulated by price limits, while the futures options contracts are allowed to trade 
without impediment. It takes the market prices for the futures options as ‘equilibrium’ prices 
and estimates the implied pricing kernel that is consistent with current market valuation of the 
underlying futures asset.  
 
A novel (continuous time) implied density estimation methodology is the so-called mixture 
model, which accounts for non-normality of the returns and possibly asymmetric features of 
the data. Ritchey (1990) assumes that the risk-neutral distribution is a mixture of lognormals 
and provides an implied density estimator for European options. Söderlind and Svensson 
(1997) and Melick and Thomas (1997) extend the mixture model to cope with the early 
exercise feature of American options
1. The Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) approximation 
is a standard approach to price American options. Other more accurate methods to price 
American futures options are based on the binomial tree methodology (see e.g., Rubinstein, 
1994, Jackwerth and Rubinstein, 1996)
2. With this method, starting at the expiration date, a 
unique risk-neutral stochastic process is identified by recursively calculating the up-move 
probabilities at each node in the recombining tree. To account for the early exercise premium, 
they treat the observed option prices as weighted averages of upper and lower no-arbitrage 
bounds. This combination of bounds, weights and parameters of the mixture distribution can 
then be estimated by non-linear least squares. Their methodology allows for skewness and 
excess kurtosis in the implied probability density function (pdf) of the underlying futures 
price returns. Time-varying volatility, and asymmetric response to price innovations, are well-
known empirical phenomena for futures price returns which may cause these distortions to 
normality in the pdf. 
 
Unfortunately, these methods require a sufficient number of ‘relevant’ observations, in 
particular, a sufficiently large range of exercise price series, in order to robustly identify the 
tails (and hence the higher order moments) of the implied futures pdf. This study’s data series 
and focus on price limit episodes does not allow for this precision. Since it only includes 
                                                           
1 Since the futures options typically have at least four months to maturity, unlike the examples in Söderlind and 
Svensson’s (1997), the early exercise adjustments required for this study are non-trivial. 
2 Note that there is an extensive literature on implied density estimation from traded option prices. The authors 
selectively refer only to those papers relevant to this study.  7
options that actually trade in price limit intervals, this study is typically restricted to options 
that are close to being at-the-money. There is little point in trying to identify implied fat-
tailedness if the tails are not sufficiently represented in the data. Melick and Thomas (1997) 
avoid this problem by using settlement prices and, in the absence of actual transactions for 
certain exercise price series, the average of bid and ask prices. 
 
This study’s approach is summarized as follows. For a representative limit episode, 
observe a sample of N traded option prices (puts and calls),  N i C
M
i ,.., 1   , = . Assume that there 
is also an unobservable arbitrage-free price  [] N i Ci ,.., 1 , = θ  for each traded option, which is a 
function of a set of parameters, θ . The market price would be expected to equal the arbitrage-
free theoretical price, but Jacquier and Jarrow (2000) suggest that there may be two sources of 
pricing errors; model errors and market errors. The model, though theoretically correct, still 
depends on a set of parameters that will typically be estimated with error. Given that the 
options are American, and the model is only an approximation to the true arbitrage free 
equilibrium price, further errors can be expected. These are classified as model errors. In 
addition, it is also possible that the market option prices are observed with error, or that the 
market may make occasional mistakes. These are classified as market errors. In the next 
section, which discusses sample selection, it is explained how the authors attempted to control 
for these errors. For now, the errors are combined, such that  
  [] i i
M
i C C ε θ + =  (1) 
and the error is assumed to be normally distributed: εσ ε i N ~, 0
2 . An important 
consideration is that the error distribution is truncated due to the existence of no-arbitrage 
boundary conditions on the traded option prices, see Martin, Forbes and Martin (2001). The 
(relevant) truncation bound for an American futures call option is given by 
{ } i
rt
i i X e f , lb
− − = 0 max , and the truncation bound for an American futures put option is 
given by  { } i i i f X lb − = , 0 max . The likelihood to maximize with respect to the parameters θ  is 
then given by 
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and Φ  represents the standard normal distribution function. 
 
Given the data restrictions, the study’s benchmark specification for  [] • i C  is the Black-
Scholes model for commodity futures options, Black (1976). Of course, since the options are 
American, allowance has to be made for early exercise value and therefore the Barone-Adesi 
and Whaley (1987) approximation (BAW) was chosen. The arbitrage-free price of an 
American call option is then 
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with the following notation: 
 f 0 = the futures price at expiration of the option, 
 f
* = the critical futures price that triggers early exercise, 
 X  = the exercise price of the option, 
  σ  = the standard deviation of futures price returns, 
 r  = the risk-free rate of return, 
 t  = the time to expiration of the option, 
 E t = the expectations operator, t periods prior to expiration. 
and  
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is the standard Black-Scholes expression for a European futures call option,  
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and based on the assumption of a log normal distribution for the futures price 
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The critical futures price is obtained by solving implicitly 











f X f d e
X f c X f
rt ∗ ∗ −
∗ ∗ Φ −
+ = −  (6) 
 
Hence, the parameter set for which (2) is optimized is θ  = (µ, σ , f
*). It should be clear from 
the above that, unlike other studies that take the underlying asset price f as given (e.g., to find 
the best fitting model), this study’s aim is to find option implied values for the underlying 
futures price f (and for σ ). These estimated parameter values are then used to assess the 
impact of the underlying futures price being locked at a price limit. 
 
Given typical empirical characteristics like fat tailedness and/or skewedness of futures 
returns, the theory-to-market fit in (1) may not be optimal when assuming a single log normal 
distribution (as in BAW) for the futures price. More complicated mixtures of lognormal 
distributions (discussed above) or more flexibly parameterized distributions have been found 
to outperform the BAW approximation. That may be less of a problem for the specific 
purpose because this study is primarily interested in the first two moments of the distribution 
and these are not necessarily distorted by the fat-tailed phenomenon. In any case for most 
traded commodity options, data considerations prevent sophisticated analysis beyond the 
single lognormal BAW approximation. 
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3  NYBOT Commodity Futures – an Application 
 
This study investigates limit occurrences for commodity futures contracts traded on the 
New York Board of Trade (NYBOT). NYBOT was created in June 1998, to become the 
parent company of the Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE) and the New York Cotton 
Exchange (NYCE). Price limits existed for CSCE’s cocoa, coffee “C”, and sugar-11 futures 
contracts until December 1997. As of today, they still exist for NYBOT’s cotton and frozen 
concentrated orange juice futures contracts
3. To facilitate a “before/after” comparison (i.e., 
with and without price limits), this application is restricted to the cocoa, coffee, and sugar 
futures contracts. All three futures contracts frequently encountered price limit moves during 
the sample period. Because investigations require a special circumstance, futures locked at 
limit, as much history as possible is required in order to generate an adequate sample size. For 
that reason the samples are based on intraday data taken from the period 1993 through 1999. 
The futures and futures options transactions data for this study were obtained directly from 
the NYBOT trade records. Treasury bill rates, for maturities matching the option series 
expiration as closely as possible have been obtained from Datastream. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the continuously compounded daily futures 
returns during the period, 1994-1999
4. A further split has been made for the maturity of the 
futures contracts. A few surprising results appear. Unlike many empirical finance studies, 
there is little evidence of non-normality. Skewness is limited and generally insignificant, 
kurtosis is excessive for the coffee contract, but to a much a smaller extent than is commonly 
found. The scale of these empirical return distributions is excessive in comparison with 
financial asset returns. The coffee futures returns have an annualized standard deviation in the 
range 45-50% across maturities, whereas sugar and cocoa futures returns have a more modest 
annualized standard deviation in the range of 18-28%, and 22-26% respectively. A 
comparison across maturities suggests that the empirical distributions are reasonably similar 
for sugar and cocoa futures returns, with a tendency for the distributions to “narrow” for 
longer maturities. This reduction in standard deviation also appears in coffee futures returns. 
However, the coffee futures returns also display significant non-normality (in terms of 
                                                           
3 NYBOT also uses limits for the NYSE Composite and Russell 1000® Index futures contracts.   11
skewness and excess kurtosis) for the nearest and next-to-nearest maturities. The longer 
maturity distributions appear more normal. 
 
The standard deviations of daily futures price changes for the nearest maturity contracts, 
were 4.85 cents for coffee, 0.17 cents for sugar, and $20.95 for cocoa. These can be compared 
to the daily price limits (6 cents, 0.5 cents and $88 respectively), which can be found in the 
contract specifications in the Appendix. It takes 1.2 daily standard deviations to hit the coffee 
limits, 3 daily standard deviations to hit the sugar limits, and 4.2 daily standard deviations to 
hit the cocoa limits. Hence, they are extreme events for sugar and cocoa, but a relatively 
frequent event for coffee. Not surprisingly, therefore, 193 limit days were observed (out of 
1245 trading days, or 15%) for coffee, 25 limit days for sugar, and only 3 limit days for 
cocoa. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Table 2 illustrates this impact of higher volatility (this causality statement is made tongue-
in-cheek) on the frequency of limit moves. It seems obvious that the study should focus on the 
coffee futures contract. For the 193 limit days, 429 contracts were observed that locked limit. 
Of these 429 contracts, only 15 were nearest-maturity or 2




th nearest-maturity. This is somewhat surprising given that it was concluded that the 1
st 
and 2
nd nearest-maturity contract displayed higher volatility and fatter tails than the almost 
normally distributed further-out maturities. 
 
Table 2 also gives a breakdown of the direction of the limit moves and their dating. The 
number of up and down limit days was fairly balanced with 115 up moves and 107 down 
moves across the three futures contracts. The numbers of up and down limit contracts are 
similarly balanced at 257 up moves, and 225 down moves across the three futures contracts. 
The inter-temporal spread was not so balanced, with 1994 and 1997 accounting for 75% of 
limit days, and 81% of limit contracts. The daily standard deviations of daily futures price 
changes for annual samples (nearest maturity contracts for coffee) were found to be 6.26 cents 
for 1994; 3.15 cents for 1995; 2.63 cents for 1996; 7.83 cents for 1997; 3.39 cents for 1998; 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 Unfortunately, the authors did not have access to the 1993 daily futures prices.   12
and 3.68 cents for 1999. Hence, the peak limit years have a standard deviation about twice as 
high as in the other years. 
This clustering of limit moves is clearly visible in Figure 1 for coffee “C” and, to some 
extent, also for sugar-11. The 1994 and 1997 limit clusters for coffee and the 1995 limit 
clusters for sugar coincide with the coffee “C” futures price and the sugar-11 futures price 
both being at peak levels. Despite this illusion of the futures price being “up,” this study still 
identifies almost as many down-limit moves as up-limit moves during those episodes.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
3.1  Limit and control sample selection 
Among the many limit moves recorded in Table 2, a substantial number occurred intra-day 
and sometimes lasted only for a short time interval. Prices would therefore not necessarily 
lock limit for the full trading day, or even close at the limit. The latter occasions would not 
appear in end-of-day settlement data used in other studies (including Melick and Thomas, 
1997 and Evans and Mahoney, 1996). These authors argue that the settlement procedure 
avoids the problems typically associated with non-synchronous quotes inherent in transactions 
data. This could arise when the option prices, from which implied futures prices are inferred, 
were based on morning transactions whereas the futures prices locked at the limit in the 
afternoon. 
 
This paper argues that this problem is not restricted to intra-day transactions data but will 
equally affect end-of-day settlement prices. The bid/ask quotes used to derive the option 
settlement prices are frequently found to be ‘stale’ for options that do not trade intra-day, and, 
therefore, may give a misleading impression of synchronicity. In fact, by using intra-day 
futures and options transactions data, this study can control more carefully for the (non) 
synchronicity of these quotes. Of course, by construction, the settlement data tend to be less 
noisy (e.g., by taking the midpoint they reduce the bid-ask noise) than transactions data. By 
including carefully constructed control samples, the study attempts to minimize this 
disadvantage of transactions data. 
 
Including (temporary) intra-day limit move episodes – in addition to limit-close days – has 
almost doubled the sample size. However, the study selected samples of effective limit 
intervals only if there were a sufficient number of traded options (with a sufficient spread in   13
exercise prices) during the limit-lock period. Furthermore, these options had to be traded 
sufficiently close-in-time to each other to ensure synchronicity and to guarantee that they 
reflected a unique implied density. This restrictive choice limited the sample size, but should 
enhance the reliability of the findings. The number of available samples that qualify is 
indicated between parentheses in the column labelled “Total” of Table 2. Out of 193 coffee 
limit days (429 limit contracts), 62 (101 limit contracts) useful samples were obtained. Of 
these 101 individual samples, 45 were temporary intra-day limit samples, and 56 locked-limit 
at the close of trading. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
Figure 2 compares the duration of the selected temporary and locked-limit episodes with 
the duration for the full sample of temporary and locked-limit episodes. The duration patterns 
are similar, but for both temporary and locked-limit intervals the selected samples tend to be 
biased towards longer durations. The reason for this is obvious, as longer durations provide 
more opportunity to observe a sufficient number of traded options. The majority of the 
temporary limit intervals are brief. In fact, seventy-five percent of selected samples last less 
than 50 minutes (this is ninety percent of the full sample). However, twenty percent of 
selected temporary intervals last for more than two hours, without locking limit at market 
close. The pattern is distinctly different for the locked-limit intervals. There are very few 
locked-limit intervals that commence shortly before market close. The shortest selected 
locked-limit interval lasted 21 minutes. Seventy-five percent last over one hour.  
 
The next step is to select control samples. Jacquier and Jarrow (2001) indicate that there 
are two potential error sources combined in ε  in equation (1) driving a wedge between market 
option prices and ‘equilibrium’ prices. To avoid drawing spurious conclusions from implied 
futures prices that deviate from the limit-lock futures price, purely because of these errors, the 
study generates two sets of control samples.  
 
The first set of control samples consists of so-called ‘checking’ intervals. The study 
selected a limit-free intra-day interval on the same day as the effective limit interval. Just as 
for the effective limit intervals, it was necessary to compile a sufficient number of traded 
options with different exercise prices, preferably traded synchronously. However, unlike the   14
effective limit intervals to get a meaningful implied expectation, there also had to be a 
guarantee that the futures price remains constant (or nearly so) over the control interval. If a 
suitable control sample could not be found on the same day as the limit interval, the study 
used the first available control interval on the subsequent trading day. This occurred 38 times, 
predominantly for down-limit samples, and, not surprisingly, mostly for limit-lock days. For a 
few cases (and longer maturities), the gap between control and effective sample could be a 
week. For two (out of 101) effective samples, a suitable control sample could not be found. 
Although this is not displayed in Figure 2, due to the selection criteria the control samples 
tend to be short-lived. 
 
The second set of control samples consists of ‘phantom’ limit intervals. Prior to December 
1997, CSCE price limits were lifted from the nearest- and next-to-nearest delivery futures 
contract two business days prior to the delivery month of the nearest-delivery contract. It has 
already been noted that the effective limit sample consists mainly of 3
rd- to 5
th-nearest 
maturity futures contracts. This provides an ideal control sample, allowing investigation of 
exceedences of the inactive price limits for the 1
st- and 2
nd-nearest futures contract when 
longer-maturity contracts were constrained at their price limits. As of December 15, 1997, the 
CSCE removed price limits from its coffee, sugar and cocoa futures contracts altogether. The 
study treated the latter years (post December 1997) in the sample as though the price limits 
were still in place and selected intra-day intervals during which these non-existent limits were 
exceeded. Selection of traded option prices during phantom limit intervals had to satisfy the 
same requirements as for the checking intervals. The required combination of a fairly stable 
futures price with a sufficiently dispersed option sample did not leave many suitable intervals. 
Table 2 indicates that post-limit only 5 out of the potential 257 phantom limit contracts are 
usable. The selection of phantom intervals for the limit years is a little more fruitful, as 56 
phantom limit contracts (46 phantom limit days) were found, of which 48 (39) occur in 1997. 
 
Figure 2 also compares the duration of the selected phantom limit episodes with the 
duration for the full sample of phantom limit episodes. The duration patterns are now 
distinctly different. As for the control samples, the selected phantom limit samples are short-
lived, with no intervals exceeding 28 minutes. Hence, the phantom limit episodes were 
selected from the bottom 80 percent of full sample durations. 
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With the samples selected, this study next investigates the impact of partial or incomplete 
price limit regulation from three perspectives. Firstly, it considers the migration of volume 
from the restricted market to the related unrestricted market. Secondly, this study investigates 
the consequences of price limits on price discovery. Thirdly, it analyses whether price limits 
have a beneficial or adverse impact on price volatility.  
 
3.2  Effects on trading volume 
When the futures market locks limit either temporarily or for the day, it has been suggested 
that trading volume migrates to related but unrestricted markets. Subrahmanyam (1994), for 
example, develops a theoretical model where triggering a circuit breaker (a temporary price 
limit) on the dominant market causes trading volume to shift to the satellite market (without a 
circuit breaker). Berkman and Steenbeek (1998) find empirical evidence for this phenomenon 
for the Nikkei stock index futures contract, which is simultaneously traded on the Osaka 
Securities Exchange (OSE) and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). 
Price limits on the OSE cause a migration of volume to the unconstrained SIMEX. 
Subrahmanyam (1994) suggests that switching costs might impede the migration. It is 
conjectured that it would be considerably cheaper to switch between derivatives on a single 
market than to switch between markets. Migration of volume should therefore be 
straightforward from futures to futures options at the NYBOT. 
 
Evans and Mahoney (1997) provide evidence of such volume migration by plotting the 
fraction of trading day in limit against futures contracts traded for both markets. First, they 
observe that daily futures volume declines significantly with the duration of the limit interval. 
An interesting question not addressed by Evans and Mahoney is whether futures volume 
compensates for the trade suspension post limit interval. Perhaps more interesting is their 
finding of a significant increase in trading volume in the options market during futures limit 
lock. When standardizing option volume into futures-equivalent volume, they find that total 
volume (futures and options combined) is virtually unchanged. 
 
Instead of looking at daily volume on limit days, this study investigates the exact intra-day 
limit intervals and compares these with the phantom limit control episodes. Obviously, when 
the limits are inactive, the futures price can change without bound after it crosses a phantom 
limit. In comparison with effective limit intervals, this implies that the phantom limit intervals 
tend to last much longer. Taking this into account, and controlling for the duration of a limit   16
interval, the study not only computed nominal volume, but also standardized per-minute 
volume.
5 The results are given in Table 3. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
The effective limits results are based on 614 intervals. Note that this is substantially more 
than the 429 limit contracts in Table 2. The difference occurs because of multiple effective 
limit spells that are counted as a single limit contract in Table 2, but counted separately for the 
purposes of Table 3. Interestingly, Table 3 indicates that futures volume does not completely 
disappear during effective limit episodes. It does, however, dry up to such an extent that a 
different count indicator was needed to distinguish it from the phantom limit interval count. 
Forty-five percent of the effective limit intervals have at least two futures transactions at the 
limit price, and ten percent have more than five futures transactions at the limit price. The 
mean number of futures transactions is 2.61. That compares to a mean of 52.87 futures 
transactions for the phantom limit intervals (of which there are 3,596). Standardizing for the 
duration, it was found that the effective limit mean is 1.12 transactions per minute against the 
phantom limit mean of almost 10 transactions per minute. In light of the skewness of these 
count distributions, the median is even more informative. The standardized effective limit 
median is 0.14 per minute against the standardized phantom limit median of 5.69 per minute. 
A considerable drop in futures volume is associated with limit episodes. 
 
As to the question of whether option volume picks up where futures volume drops off, 
consider the lower part of Table 3. Most strikingly, unlike futures volume, an expanded count 
measure for phantom limit options volume was not needed. In fact, the count distributions 
look fairly similar. For both effective limit and phantom limit intervals, sixty percent have 
zero option transactions. Eighty-five percent of effective limit intervals have five or less 
option transactions. This is eighty-four percent for phantom limit intervals. Standardized by 
duration, there is some evidence in the mean option volume measure that option volume is 
more dispersed for phantom limit intervals than for effective limit intervals. On the other 
hand, if one looks at the median option volume there is little between them. 
 
                                                           
5 Note that volume is here defined as the number of transactions that occur within a particular time period. The 
size of the transaction is not taken into account. Little evidence was found of a change in the transaction size 
conditional on a limit move. However, significant changes were found in the number of transactions.   17
There is little evidence to suggest a migration of volume from the constrained to the 
unconstrained market. This is a somewhat unfortunate implication for the implied futures 
price derivation of the next exercise. As already discussed in the sample selection section, 
given that at the very least two options are needed to compute the implied density measures, 
this leaves very few useful limit episodes. 
 
3.3  Effects on price discovery 
Most academics agree that price discovery is (at the very least temporarily) obstructed by 
price limits. Brennan (1994) investigates to what extent external (noisy) price signals alleviate 
the price discovery problem in a constrained futures market. High signal to noise ratios, as 
used in his model simulations, suggest that Brennan believes these signals to be typically 
strong (in fact he calls a correlation between signal and equilibrium futures price of 0.75 
moderate). Brennan suggests that these signals come predominantly from the underlying 
cash/spot market. Convergence of cash and futures price close to maturity then explains why 
limits are lifted in the delivery month of the nearest maturity contract (they become obsolete 
in Brennan’s cost minimizing contract design). Unfortunately, the researcher typically has no 
access to a high-frequency cash commodity price for agricultural futures contracts. Even for 
futures market practitioners, this quest for a unique underlying spot price may prove elusive. 
Instead, it is believed that a stronger signal may emerge from the unconstrained futures 
options price. 
 
That said, given the observed lack of depth in the options market, one would not expect to 
get overly strong price signals indicating market direction during limit lock. This study 
therefore selected limit episodes that contain a sufficient number of traded options to identify 
the implied futures price and implied volatility. It should be clear that the stringent sample 
selection criteria considerably limit the sample size. Ultimately, there are 101 useful effective 
limit intervals. This sample was separated into temporary limit intervals and locked-limit 
intervals. Of the 45 temporary limit intervals, 12 are down-limits and 33 are up-limits. Of the 
56 locked-limit intervals, 19 are down-limits and 37 are up-limits. Implied futures pricing 
errors for the locked limit sample are given in Figure 3. These pricing errors are defined as the 
difference between the options implied futures price and the limit price. One would expect 
positive pricing errors for up-limits, and negative pricing errors for down-limits. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3   18
 
The left-hand side of Figure 3 displays the down-limit episodes (◆  markers on the lower 
axis). Options implied futures prices are given by square symbols (■ ) for the effective limit 
samples, and by triangle symbols (▲ ) for the control samples. First note that 15 (out of 19) 
effective down-limit samples have a negative pricing error, and 36 (out of 37) effective up-
limit samples have a positive pricing error. The direction of market expectations seems 
sensible. For the control sample, the study found 7 (out of 17) negative pricing errors for 
down-limits, and 23 (out of 37) positive pricing errors for up-limits. However, the up-limit 
control pricing errors are generally (31 out of 37) smaller than the effective limit pricing 
errors. For the down-limit sample, the control pricing errors are less distinguishable from the 
effective limit pricing errors. The study only found a significant limit effect for the up-limit 
episodes. 
 
Implied futures pricing errors for the temporary limit sample are given in Figure 4. The 
fact that these were temporary trade disruptions indicates that the market subsequently 
resumed trading within the allowed price range. One would not necessarily expect positive 
pricing errors for up-limit episodes and negative pricing errors for down-limit periods. The 
study found most implied pricing errors to be insignificantly different from zero (and 
frequently smaller than the control pricing errors). None of the down-limit samples give any 
price direction signal. Only 4 (out of 33) up-limit samples suggest an upward price 
expectation, and the remainder give no price direction signal.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 
 
Implied futures pricing errors for the phantom limit sample are given in Figure 5. For the 
up-limit intervals, there is little evidence of a directional effect with an even spread of 
positive/negative pricing errors. For the down-limit intervals, most pricing errors are positive, 
although few of these are significantly different from zero. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 
 
As mentioned above, one would a priori expect up (down) limit moves to be associated 
with positive (negative) pricing errors. However, from Figure 4, it was concluded that prices   19
sometimes revert inside the allowable price range. If the option traders correctly assess this 
probability, one is likely to find opposite pricing errors to those expected a priori. The study 
next investigates the fit of the futures price expectation to the next available ‘free’ futures 
price. A scatter plot of implied futures price changes against next futures price changes is 
given in Figure 6. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 
 
For the temporary limit intervals the study takes the next off-limit price inside the allowed 
price range on the same trading day. For the locked-limit intervals it takes the first traded 
price on the next trading day (there were no occasions when this price was immediately at the 
next limit). Figure 6a suggests that there is little evidence of a relationship between implied 
and observed futures price change (the relationship is clearly distorted by a single 
observation) for temporary limit intervals. Figure 6b, on the other hand, suggests a strong 
positive relationship between the implied and observed futures price changes for locked-limit 
intervals.  
 
At the risk of presenting anecdotal evidence, it is worthwhile to investigate the intra-day 
price discovery in some detail. Figure 7 gives plots for three limit days with a mixture of 
successive temporary and locked limit intervals. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 7 
 
On the 17
th of May 1994, the upper price limit was hit early after the opening of trading. 
The first temporary limit interval gives an implied futures price well above the limit price. 
However, trading resumed within the price range and after a while the upper limit was hit for 
a second time. The second temporary limit interval now delivers an implied futures price just 
below the limit price. Subsequently, trading resumes at prices well within the price range, but 
the upper price limit is still hit on a number of occasions. The implied futures price 
successively converges to the limit price. Clearly, option traders’ market expectations are in 
line with the observed price movements. At the end of the day, trading occurs at prices 
substantially below the upper limit price. 
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On the 13
th of June 1994, the first traded futures price occurs at the upper limit. The 
options implied futures price is surprisingly somewhat below the upper limit price. 
Subsequently, trading resumes at, and then below, the upper limit price until the limit is hit 
for a third
6 time at noon. This last episode is a locked-limit interval for which the implied 
futures price is well above the limit price. The next day, trading resumes at a price even 
higher than this implied price. 
 
The trading pattern on the 28
th of May 1997, is similar to the last discussed limit day. The 
futures price hits the upper limit in the early morning (with an implied futures price just below 
the limit price). It then reverts back inside the price range, but quickly hits the upper limit 
again. The second implied futures price is now well above the limit price, and trading is 
interrupted for well over an hour. Then, trading resumes for a little while just inside the upper 
limit, before locking limit for the rest of the day. This resumption of trade leads to a 
downward adjustment of the implied futures price, though it is still well above the limit price. 
The next day, trading resumes at a price between the second and third implied futures prices. 
 
Combining these pieces of evidence, it is tentatively concluded that the futures options 
market does indeed provide reasonably accurate futures price signals when the futures market 
is constrained by price limits. Recall that this is despite the fact that options volume does not 
significantly increase. Of course, this may indicate that the uncertainty surrounding the 
implied futures price expectation increases when the futures price locks limit. Also, as the 
study computed the risk-neutral expectation and not the ‘true’ expectation, and since it cannot 
be observed whether there is a risk premium, or whether this risk premium depends on limit 
moves, one has to be somewhat cautious in drawing conclusions from the findings. 
 
3.4  Effects on volatility 
Most of the price limit literature has, in fact, focused on the impact on volatility. Ma, Rao 
and Sears (1989) find a moderating impact on Treasury bond futures volatility. Lee, Ready 
and Seguin (1994) find evidence of excessive volatility subsequent to a trading halt on the 
New York Stock Exchange. McMillan (1991) finds similar evidence subsequent to a circuit 
breaker in the S&P500 index futures market. Of course, one has to be careful in drawing 
conclusions from a post-limit increase in observed volatility. Part of this increase reflects the 
                                                           
6 Since the second and third limit episodes did not meet the selection criteria, there is no implied futures price. 
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spillover of unresolved volatility when the price limits were hit. Carefully constructed control 
samples (such as pseudo-halts in Lee, Ready and Seguin) are needed to unravel this 
intertemporal distortion in volatility from the underlying change in volatility. This study 
follows a similar procedure. It compares the options implied volatility during effective limit 
intervals with the options implied volatility during matching control intervals. NYBOT 
publishes daily options implied volatility measured across At-The-Money, In-The-Money and 
Out-of-The-Money options. Due to the volatility “smile”, this average tends to be biased 
upwards. Since the study is restricted to traded options, it is automatically restricting the 
implied volatility computation to ATM or nearly-ATM options. 
 
Figure 8 displays implied volatility for the temporary limit sample. All volatility series are 
measured as the annualized percentage standard deviation of futures returns. The (◆ ) 
diamond markers indicate historical volatility as computed by NYBOT over the past 30 days 
of (nearest-maturity) futures settlement prices. In contrast to the implied volatility derived 
from the limit sample (■ ) and the implied volatility derived from the control sample (▲ ), the 
historical volatility is substantially higher. More importantly for present purposes with a few 
exceptions, the limit and control volatilities are typically very close. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 8 
 
Figure 9 displays implied volatility for the locked-limit sample. Historical volatility still 
exceeds the implied volatility measures. Now, however, the control and limit volatilities are 
clearly different with the locked-limit implied volatility consistently exceeding the control 
implied volatility.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 9 
 
Figure 10 displays implied volatility for the phantom limit sample. These measures are 
compared with historical volatility and implied volatility as computed and published by 
NYBOT. There is a relatively constant gap between NYBOT’s daily published measure and 
that of this study, which is based on the phantom limit sample only. It is suspected that this 
gap reflects the upward bias in NYBOT’s measure. 
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INSERT FIGURE 10 
 
Volatility is clearly affected by price limits, but a qualification applies. When the trade 
interruption is temporary, no increase in volatility was observed, but when the futures price 
locks limit for the remainder of the trading day increased volatility is observed. 
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4 Conclusions 
 
This paper considers the migration of price discovery from a price constrained derivatives 
market to a related, unconstrained, derivatives market. The typical research questions 
regarding price limits consider the obstruction of price discovery and their impact on the 
volatility of price changes. Based on implied futures price density estimates from traded 
options, this study directly addresses both questions. Data restriction focuses the study’s 
application on coffee “C” futures trading on the New York Board of Trade. When the futures 
price hits either limit, this study derives the implied futures price and implied volatility from 
traded futures options prices that are not constrained. The sample is separated into temporary 
limit intervals and locked-limit intervals. For the former, trading resumes on the same trading 
day at futures prices within the allowed range. For the latter, trading is interrupted for the day 
and trading only resumes the next trading day when the limits have moved. This distinction is 
important since it was found that only for locked-limit intervals do the implied futures prices 
indicate that price discovery shifts to the futures options market. This is particularly 
interesting, because little evidence of an increase in traded options volume was found during 
futures limit lock. Another interesting feature of the results is that options implied volatility 
seems to increase only for the limit-lock intervals. Implied volatility during temporary trade 
interruptions is indistinguishable from implied volatility during control periods when the 
market can observe the underlying futures price. 
 
Two previous papers have dealt with this issue and found that both volume and price 
discovery migrate to the unconstrained market when limits are invoked on the constrained 
market. Whereas these two studies were based on event-like samples (a single day for one 
study), this analysis is more comprehensive in that it covers a five year sample of constrained 
futures trading, as well as a subsequent period of two years when the limits were lifted. This 
provides an ideal before/after experimental setting. Another important contribution of this 
study is its use of options transactions data, instead of the more common end-of-day 
settlement data. This mitigates the problems of non-synchronicity between futures and futures 
options prices, as well as between different futures options series.   24
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Appendix: CSCE Futures and Futures Options Contract Specs 
 
COFFEE “C” 
Price limits are set 6 cents above and below the previous settlement price (lifted on 15/12/1997). 
KC Futures 
Trading time 9:15am-1:32pm New York time 
Price quotation in cents per pound 
Delivery months: March, May, July, September, December 
Minimum price fluctuation: 5/100 cent/lb. 
Last trading day: one business day prior to last notice day 
Last notice day: seven business days prior to last business day of delivery month 
KC Futures Option 
Trading time 9:15am-1:30pm New York time 
Price quotation in cents per pound 
Delivery months: March, May, July, September, December 
Minimum price fluctuation: 1/100 cent/lb. 
First trading day: first trading day following the last trading day of any expiring regular option month 
Last trading day: second Friday of the calendar month (minimum of 4 trading days between last trading day and 
the first notice day of the expiring future) 
Expiration date/time: 9:00pm New York Time on the last trading day.  
 
SUGAR-11 
Price limits are set 0.5 cents above and below the previous settlement price (lifted on 15/12/1997). 
SB Futures 
Trading time 9:30am-1:20pm New York time 
Price quotation in cents per pound 
Delivery months: March, May, July, September, December 
Minimum price fluctuation: 1/100 cent/lb.  
Last trading day: last business day of the month preceding delivery month. 
Notice day: first business day after the last trading day. 
SB Futures Option 
Trading time 9:30am-1:18pm New York time 
Price quotation in cents per pound 
Delivery months: March, May, July, September, December 
Minimum price fluctuation: 1/100 cent/lb. 
First trading day: first trading day following the last trading day of any expiring regular option month 
Last trading day: second Friday of the calendar month (minimum of 4 trading days between last trading day and 
the first notice day of the expiring future) 
Expiration date/time: 9:00pm New York Time on the last trading day.  
 
COCOA  
Price limits are set 88 dollars above and below the previous settlement price (lifted on 15/12/1997). 
CC Futures 
Trading time 8:30am-1:30pm New York time 
Price quotation in dollars per metric ton  
Delivery months: March, May, July, September, December 
Minimum price fluctuation: $1/mt. 
Last trading day: one business day prior to last notice day 
Last notice day: ten business days prior to last business day of delivery month 
CC Futures Option 
Trading time 9:00am-1:25pm New York time 
Price quotation in dollars per metric ton 
Delivery months: March, May, July, September, December 
Minimum price fluctuation: $1/mt.  
First trading day: first trading day following the last trading day of any expiring regular option month 
Last trading day: first Friday of the month preceding the contract month. 
Expiration date/time: 9:00pm New York Time on the last trading day.   26
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of daily futures returns 
  Nearest Next-to-
nearest 
Third Fourth Fifth 
COFFEE       
Mean  0.07% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 
Std Deviation  3.02% 2.83% 2.47% 2.38% 2.36% 
Maximum 23.77% 23.23% 19.04% 18.28% 17.54% 
Minimum -15.03%  -13.89%  -13.25% -13.45% -15.59% 
Range  38.80% 37.12% 32.29% 31.73% 33.13% 
Skewness  0.58 (0.000)  0.67 (0.000)  0.04 (0.517)  -0.02 (0.751)  -0.13 (0.051) 
Kurtosis  7.80 (0.000)  8.94 (0.000)  4.50 (0.000)  4.80 (0.000)  5.18 (0.000) 
Sample  Size  1459 1462 1462 1462 1462 
SUGAR       
Mean  -0.00% -0.03% -0.04% -0.04% -0.03% 
Std Deviation  1.77% 1.53% 1.33% 1.24% 1.16% 
Maximum 8.60% 8.20% 7.54% 8.11% 8.33% 
Minimum -9.07%  -7.23%  -5.75% -5.82% -5.27% 
Range  17.67% 15.43% 13.28% 13.93% 13.60% 
Skewness  -0.20 (0.002)  -0.18 (0.005)  -0.21 (0.001)  -0.26 (0.000)  -0.20 (0.002) 
Kurtosis  2.96 (0.731)  3.42 (0.001)  3.22 (0.083)  4.18 (0.000)  4.61 (0.000) 
Sample  size  1475 1475 1475 1475 1475 
COCOA       
Mean  -0.07% -0.07% -0.07% -0.07% -0.06% 
Std Deviation  1.63% 1.55% 1.46% 1.41% 1.37% 
Maximum 9.96% 9.87% 9.49% 9.15% 8.73% 
Minimum -5.32%  -6.81%  -6.53% -6.47% -6.49% 
Range  15.28% 16.68% 16.03% 15.62% 15.23% 
Skewness  0.55 (0.000)  0.50 (0.000)  0.43 (0.000)  0.43 (0.000)  0.40 (0.000) 
Kurtosis  3.17 (0.191)  3.38 (0.003)  3.06 (0.662)  3.13 (0.318)  3.02 (0.898) 
Sample  size  1466 1469 1469 1469 1469 
 
The table reports sample statistics of continuously compounded futures returns from 1994-1999. The data is 
sourced from the NYBOT web page. Column headers indicate futures contracts of different maturities. The 
sample statistics are the sample mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, range, skewness, kurtosis and 
the sample size. The numbers in parenthesis after the skewness measure is the p-value for the two sided 
hypothesis test H0: Skewness = 0, and the numbers in parenthesis after the kurtosis measure is the p-value for the 
two sided hypothesis test H0: Kurtosis = 3.   27
 
Table 2. Limit occurrences of CSCE futures contracts, 1993-1999 
 
 
 Limit  Days Limit  Contracts 











KC – Coffee “C”                 
♥     1993
   1  2  0  0  3  (1)  2  3  0  0  5  (2) 
♥     1994  35  32  9  6  82  (38)  90  71  24  18  199 (70) 
♥  ♠ 1995  6  19  0  1  26  (1)  9  35  0  1  45  (1) 
♥  ♠ 1996  4  4  0  0  8  (1)  8  4  0  0  12  (1) 
♥  ♠ 1997  45  21  2  6  74  (21)  98  50  5  15  168 (27) 
♠  1998
  17  22  -  -  39  (3)  36  51  -  -  87  (3) 
♠  1999  21  17  -  -  38  (1)  94  76  -  -  170  (2) 
SB – Sugar – 11             
1993  4  4 0 0  8  6 6 0 0  12 
1994  3  3 0 0  6  6 5 0 0  11 
1995  0  8 0 0  8  0  16  0 0  16 
1996  2  1 0 0  3  2 1 0 0  3 
1997  0  0 0 0  0  0 0 0 0  0 
1998
  2  4  -  -  6  4  11  -  -  15 
1999  3  2  -  -  5  9  3  -  -  12 
CC – Cocoa             
1993  0  0 0 0  0  0 0 0 0  0 
1994  3  0 1 0  3  6 0 1 0  7 
1995  0  0 0 0  0  0 0 0 0  0 
1996  0  0 0 0  0  0 0 0 0  0 
1997  0  0 0 0  0  0 0 0 0  0 
1998
  0  0  -  -  0  0  0  -  -  0 
1999  3  0  -  -  3  12  0  -  -  12 
 
This table catalogues the number of lock-limit days and the number of contracts involved in the period 1993 to 
1999. The 1998 numbers include the period December 15, 1997 until December 31, 1997 – during which limits 
on CSCE futures were abandoned.  
 
There are separate columns for up-limit and down-limit as well as expanded up-limit (Exp up) and expanded 
down limit (Exp down) episodes. The Total column gives the sum of all limit episodes and contracts involved. 
The numbers in parentheses in the total column represent the number of useful episodes satisfying the sample 
selection procedure. The symbol ♥  indicates that effective limit samples and the symbol ♠  indicates that 
phantom limit samples could be selected during this year. Shaded rows indicate years when the limits were 
abandoned. There were 56 useful phantom limit samples for the period 1993-1997. 
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Table 3. Coffee “C” futures volume migration? 
 
FUTURES Transactions 
 Effective  Limits 
#  Phantom Limits 
## 
Count  Frequency  Per minute  Frequency  Per minute  Count 
1  44.95 %  81.27 %  33.34 %  13.10 %  1 
2  22.48 %  8.47 %  29.84 %  32.59 %  <1,5] 
3  11.24 %  3.09 %  9.23 %  23.78 %  <5,10] 
4  7.00 %  0.81 %  4.92 %  12.12 %  <10,15] 
5  4.40 %  1.14 %  2.61 %  6.79 %  <15,20] 
6  2.77 %  0.98 %  2.09 %  2.09 %  <20,25] 
7  2.44 %  0.81 %  1.25 %  5.26 %  <25,30] 
8  1.14 %  0.65 %  1.42 %  0.44 %  <30,35] 
9  1.14 %  0.33 %  0.81 %  0.70 %  <35,40] 
10  0.33 %  0.49 %  1.08 %  0.14 %  <40,45] 
<10,15]  1.30 %  0.33 %  0.56 %  0.03 %  <45,50] 
>15  0.81 %  1.63 %  12.85 %  2.98 %  >50 
Max 19  45  2491  120 
Mean 2.61  1.12  52.87  9.95 
Median  2.00 0.14 3.00  5.69 
Std.Dev. 2.58  3.62  200.43  12.50 
OPTIONS Transactions 
 Effective  Limits 
#  Phantom Limits 
## 
Count  Frequency  Per minute  Frequency  Per minute 
0  59.12 %  59.12 %  60.07 %  60.07 % 
1  9.93 %  36.48 %  11.15 %  15.41 % 
2  6.35 %  2.44 %  6.34 %  9.45 % 
3  4.89 %  0.98 %  3.45 %  5.39 % 
4  2.77 %  0.49 %  2.22 %  3.03 % 
5  2.28 %  0.33 %  1.33 %  1.64 % 
<5,10]  6.35 %  0.16 %  3.75 %  2.98 % 
<10,15]  3.09 %  -  1.97 %  0.83 % 
<15,20]  1.63 %  -  1.17 %  0.50 % 
<20,25]  0.16 %  -  1.06 %  0.19 % 
<25,30]  0.81 %  -  0.67 %  0.31 % 
>30  2.61 %  -  6.81 %  0.19 % 
Max 159  5  1506  60 
Mean 3.60  0.17  12.41  1.18 
Median  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Std.Dev.  11.75 0.52 59.89  3.73 
 
The count column measures the number of futures and futures options transactions. Effective limit episodes are 
sampled from 1993 to December 1997 (total of 614). Phantom limit episodes are sampled from 1993 through 
1999 (total of 3596). The “Frequency” columns measure the number of episodes as a percentage of the total 
number of episodes with a particular count. The “Per minute” columns standardize the frequency for the duration 
of the episodes.  
# The mean duration of an effective limit episode is 54 minutes (median duration is 16 minutes; 
maximum duration is 280 minutes, minimum duration is 2 seconds). 
## The mean duration of a phantom limit 
episode is 21 minutes (median duration is 45 seconds; maximum duration is 285 minutes, minimum duration is 2 
seconds).   29















The upper ◆  marks indicate limit days. 
 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The x-axis gives the percentage of all limit episodes that occurred from 1993-1997 (until 1999 for the phantom 
limit sample). A limit episode starts when the price first hits the upper or lower limit and ends when trading 
resumes at a price within the limit range or when trading closes for the day. The y-axis gives the duration of a 
limit episode in minutes. 
 
 
















The x-axis gives the percentage of limit episodes that satisfy the selection criteria for the empirical exercise. A 
limit episode starts when the price first hits the upper or lower limit and ends when trading resumes at a price 







































Sample Phantom  32
















Pricing error is defined as the difference between the options implied futures price and the observed (limit) 
futures price. Implied (■ ) indicates limit episodes; Control (▲ ) indicates control episodes when the futures price 
was not limited on the same day as the limit episode. The sample is partitioned into lower limit episodes (◆  
marks on the lower axis) and upper limit episodes (◆  marks on the upper axis). 
 















Pricing error is defined as the difference between the options implied futures price and the observed (limit) 
futures price. Implied (■ ) indicates limit episodes; Control (▲ ) indicates control episodes when the futures price 
was not limited on the same day as the limit episode. The sample is partitioned into lower limit episodes (◆  












































Limit Flag  33


















Pricing error is defined as the difference between the options implied futures price and the observed futures 
price. Implied (■ ) indicates phantom limit episodes. The sample is partitioned into lower limit episodes (◆  



















Limit Flag  34






















The implied price change is the futures price implied by options traded during the limit lock interval minus the 
limit price in US cents. The next price change is the first available futures price which occurs inside the limits on 



















The implied price is the futures price implied by options traded during the limit lock interval minus the limit 

















































































OptF1 to OptF7 indicate the options implied futures prices when the observed futures price was at its upper limit. 
Only the limit episodes that meet the sample selection criteria are displayed. 
 
OptF1 to OptF7 indicate the options implied futures price when the observed futures price was at its upper limit. 
Only the limit episodes that meet the sample selection criteria are displayed. NextF indicates the next available 
futures price that is off limit (in this case, the next day’s first traded price). 




























Limit price F = 128.50
optF7 = 131.96
nextF




























optF5 = 124.23 optF7 = 124.26
optF6 = 123.89  36
 
OptF1 to OptF5 indicate the options implied futures prices when the observed futures price was at its upper limit. 
Only the limit episodes that meet the sample selection criteria are displayed. NextF indicates the next available 
futures price that is off limit (in this case, the next day’s first traded price). 
 
























Limit Price F = 207.95
optF3 = 222.45
nextF  37






































































n control - limit sample












































Implied - control  38












































































n phantom - limit sample
historical
NYBOT implied volatility